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The no longer inchoate technology of 3-D printing will revolutionize the
current balance of regulation involved with international arms trafficking and
digital freedom of speech by greatly democratizing and decentralizing the
manufacturing of arms worldwide. Specifically, individuals worldwide will no
longer need to purchase weapons from established and regulated manufacturers.
Rather, in the near future, interested gun owners will simply need an intemet
connection, a 3-D printer, and the necessary raw materials, and with a click of the
mouse, a layperson can have a workable unregistered weapon without a serial
number or record of its manufacture. Future attempts by international legislators
to regulate this technology will prove to be ineffective, similar to efforts to prevent
the illegal downloading of music or film. Moreover, any attempt to disrupt the
dissemination of the source code templates for these weapons will raise new
questions regarding what are the boundaries of digital freedom of speech as
recognized by international law.
A. What is 3-D Printing
3-D printing, also known as "additive manufacturing," is the process of
creating a digital model or blueprint of a desired object using Computer-Aided
Design ("CAD") software and "printing" off the desired object.' The CAD permits
the construction of the object by taking a series of digital layers and transcribes
each layer of the object to the 3-D printer.2 The desired object is created by adding
continuous layers of the raw material according to the design set forth until the
finished product eventually emerges within the printer. 3 To better understand this
unique manufacturing process, it is important to appreciate the difference between
additive manufacturing and traditional manufacturing techniques. Additive
manufacturing works by directly layering successive materials, whereas traditional
manufacturing is done much in the same way a sculptor approaches his unfinished
* Jean-Yves Meyer won the 2012 Leonard v.B. Sutton writing contest. Jean is expected to complete his
Juris Doctor at the University of Denver, Sturm College of Law in May 2014.
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medium: by cutting away material from the template. Thus, additive
manufacturing uses much less material.4
There are different engineering methods by which each of the layers may be
joined. For example, some 3-D printers use powders as the print medium. By
spreading thin layers of the raw materials, such as aluminum powder, a laser can
melt the powder into the desired shape through a process called laser sintering.5
Alternatively, an extrusion nozzle can spray extremely thin layers of thermoplastic
polymers that harden immediately after extrusion.6 As each layer of plastic
hardens, it serves as a base upon which further material can be added. Companies
around the world are developing their own methods of 3-D printing unique from
the methods just described using over different materials from plastic to titanium
as base media.7 Nevertheless, additive manufacturing is the one common method
of production generally incorporated by all 3-D printer manufacturers.
Although 3-D printing technology has existed in its infancy for several
decades now, it was only recently that the technology began to mature. In March
of 2012, individuals at the University of Technology, Vienna, created a "nano
racing car" through a process called two-photon lithography.8 Using this 3-D
printing technology, scientists were able to manufacture a car in a mere four
minutes that was four times the size of a human's hair.9 The applications of this
technology are astonishing. In June 2011, an eighty-three-year-old woman
underwent surgery for a jaw transplant that doctors manufactured through the
process of 3-D printing.'o The doctors manufactured the jaw implant using
titanium powder fused together by heating the powder one layer at a time using a
laser." As of 2013, 3-D printers have only been able to print primary structures
(not, for example, computers or iPods), but Mr. Michael Idelchik of GE Global
Research believes "one day we will print an engine.",2
Much like emerging computer and printing technology from the 1980's and
4. Jane Bird, Exploring the 3D Printing Opportunity, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2012, 5:39 PM),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6dcl1070-d763- llel-a378-00144feabdcO.html#axzz2Q4nnOjND.
5. Id.
6. See Cdline Bellehumeur et al., Modeling of Bond Formation Between Polymer
Filaments in the Fused Deposition Modeling Process, 6 J. Manufacturing Processes 170,
170 (2004).
7. Brad Hart, Will 3D Printing Change the World?, FORBES (Mar. 6, 2012, 2:09 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/gcaptain/2012/03/06/will-3d-printing-change-the-world.
8. Tibi Puiu, Nanoscale Objects Created by 3D Printer in Record Speed, ZME SCIENCE (Mar.
12, 2012), http://www.zmescience.com/research/technology/nano-objects-3d-printer-faster-speed-
0423954.
9. Rituparna Chatterjee, 3D Printing: The Technology Can Revolutionize Manufacturing &
Healthcare Industry, THE ECON. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2012, 4:49 AM),
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-03-15/news/31197145 I body-parts-3d-scooter.
10. Transplant Jaw Made By 3D Printer Claimed as First, BBC (Feb. 6, 2012, 9:07 PM),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology- 16907104.
11. Id.
12. Solid Print: Making Things with a 3D Printer Changes the Rules of Manufacturing, THE
ECONOMIST (Apr. 21, 2012), http://www.economist.com/node/21552892.
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1990's, 3-D printing machines have decreased in cost and improved in
performance capacity. Basic non-industrial 3-D printers can now be purchased for
as little as USD $400.'1 Additionally, new recycling technologies have paved the
way for obtaining the raw materials for production from common domestic items
such as plastic water bottles or Lego bricks.14
The evolution of 3-D printing is coupled with a certain culture of direct
participation in the manufacturing phase by end users. Specifically, Wikipedia-
styled websites such as RepRap.org are using the GNU General Public License
that guarantees the public's right to use, study, share, and modify the software.' 5
Thingverse.com, another open source 3-D printing website, states that the
website's purpose is to "create a community of people who create and share
designs freely, so that all can benefit from them."' 6  As a result of this
unconventional understanding of proprietary information, the doors of
manufacturing are democratized with the sharing of code.
B. 3-D Printing ofSmall Arms and Light Weapons
This paper will focus its attention exclusively on the illicit manufacturing and
trafficking of small arms and light weapons ("SALW"). SALW are man portable
lethal weapons that expel or launch a projectile using the action of an explosive.' 7
"Small arms" are designed for personal use and include, inter alia, revolvers,
assault-rifles, and rifles.'1 "Light Weapons such as heavy machine guns, grenade
launchers, and mortars of a caliber less than 100 millimeters "are generally
designed for use by multiple persons.19
The "Wiki Weapon Project," seemingly the most notorious and discussed 3-D
printing small arms project, is an effort by Defense Distributed, a non-profit based
in Austin Texas, to produce "a freely-distributed open source design for a 3-D
printed firearm."20 To date, 3-D printing has achieved the printing of thirty round
magazines for an AR-15, muzzle suppressors, and an AR-15 reinforced lower
receiver.21 Within the United States, the only regulated part of an AR-15 weapon
13. PrintrbotJr., PRINTRBOT, http://printrbot.com/shop/printrbot-jr (last visited Jan. 1, 2013).
14. Oliver Wainwright, The Filabot Will Revolutionise the Home 3D-Printing Market, THE
GUARDIAN (Jan. 15, 2013), http://www.guardian.co.uk/artanddesign/architecture-design-
blog/2013/jan/I5/filabot-home-3d-printing-recycle.
15. GNU General Public License, GNU OPERATING SYSTEM (June 29, 2007),
http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html (version 3).
16. About, THINGIVERSE, http://www.thingiverse.com/about (last visited Jan. 5, 2013).
17. Rep. of the Open-Ended Working Grp. to Negotiate an Int'I Instrument to Enable States to
Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons, Annex, |
4, U.N. Doc. A/60/88 (June 27, 2005).
18. Id. 1| 4(a).
19. Id. 1| 4(b).
20. Clay Dillow, Q+A: Cody Wilson of the Wiki Weapon Project on the 3-D Printed Future of
Firearms, POPULAR SCI. (Dec. 21, 2012, 5:50 PM), http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/2012-
12/qa-cody-wilson-wiki-weapons-project-3-d-printed-future-firearms.
21. AR-15 Magazine-30 Round Magazine, DEFCAD, http://defcad.org/ar-15-magazine-30-
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is the lower receiver, because it satisfies the definition of a "firearm" set forth by
the Gun Control Act of 1968.22 While it is currently impossible to print off a
working version of an AR-15 in its totality, one likely outcome of this technology
will be a separation of production between the legal manufacturing of the rest of
weapon and the illicit manufacturing of the regulated lower receiver.
For many years, gun enthusiasts and underground market participants have
illicitly manufactured small arms, both domestically and internationally, in
countries where the manufacture of such arms is illegal. For example, a carryover
law from the British Colonial regime continues to prohibit the manufacture of
SALW in Ghana. 23  Today, Ghana has a thriving illegal gun manufacturing
industry in which local gunsmiths use readily available materials to produce
working copies of AK-47s at a collective annual production rate of one hundred
thousand weapons per year. 24 Within the United States "Saturday Night Specials"
or "Zip Guns" are sometimes manufactured, and used, even by children, despite
the often lethal consequences to the user because of catastrophic failure of
materials used when fired.25
The 3-D printing of SALW will further promote the illicit manufacture of
arms by facilitating and democratizing the process of manufacture. 3-D printing
will achieve this by doing the following: 1) removing the knowledge barrier of
illicit manufacturing so that inexperienced gunsmiths are able to produce
workable guns with ease; 2) reducing the burden of transport by allowing the direct
manufacture of SALW in the zone of conflict as opposed to requiring the transport
of weapons across state borders; and 3) improving the quality of weapons by
permitting the instantaneous modification of weapons as desired.
Despite the fact that technology to 3-D print a gun like an AR-15 is still in its
infancy, it is likely that the capacity of technology to manufacture a functional
weapon from the comfort of one's home is quickly approaching. Nevertheless, the
extreme prevalence of weapons already available within the United States for
purchase will make the effects of 3-D printing technology less disruptive
domestically than elsewhere in the world. Evidence for such a claim can be found
in the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms and Explosives' ("ATF")
records. The ATF estimates that in 2010 alone almost 5.5 million firearms were
round-mag (last visited Apr. 19, 2013) (an example of one of the gun parts that can be manufactured
through this website).
22. Jon Kalish, Weapons Made With 3-D Printers Could Complicate Gun Control Laws, NPR
(Feb. 25, 2013, 3:00 PM), http://www.npr.org/2013/02/25/172905444/weapons-made-with-3-d-printers-
could-complicate-gun-control-laws. See also 18 U.S.C. § 921 (2006) (describes that the receiver is
included in the definition of a firearm).
23. David B. Kopel et al., The Arms Trade Treaty: Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, and the Prospects for Arms Embargoes on Human Rights Violators, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 891,
902-03 (2010).
24. Id. at 903.
25. Gary J. Ordog et al., Homemade Guns, 27 J. OF TRAUMA 646, 646 (1987).
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manufactured within the United States. 26 Additionally, individuals who would
otherwise be prohibited from purchasing a weapon within the United States (e.g.
convicted felons or addicts of illegal controlled substances) 27 can purchase a
weapon through a "straw purchase." This creates a relatively unfertile demand for
the expanded use of this technology domestically. A "straw purchase" occurs
when the actual buyer of a weapon uses a "straw purchaser" to execute the
purchasing form ("Form 4473") representing that the "straw purchaser" is the
actual purchaser of the weapon when this is actually not the case. 28 Generally, a
"straw purchaser" is hired when the actual purchaser is prohibited by law from
acquiring the firearm, desires to acquire a firearm, and thus engages the "straw
purchaser" to misrepresent himself to the vendor as the actual purchaser. 29
Nonetheless, it is likely that in countries where existing gun control legislation is
stringent, the effects of 3-D printing will be considerable.
II. EXISTING INTERNATIONAL LAW REGULATING SALW
There currently exist six multilateral arms trafficking agreements apposite to
the regulation of SALW. 30 The first three discussed are non-binding whereas the
second three are binding to signatory states.3 ' These six agreements will be
introduced here and will be discussed in greater detail later in the paper.
A. Multilateral Arms Trafficking Agreements
First, the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light
Weapons 32 ("U.N. Programme") was drafted in response to concerns regarding the
illicit manufacture, transfer, and circulation of small arms and light weapons.3 3 It
serves as an aspirational document that puts in place adequate laws and regulations
to control the illicit manufacture of SALW nationally. 34 The U.N. Programme
attempts to accomplish this goal by providing a framework of national
coordination agencies and creating the means for the tracing and record keeping of
26. BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS & ExPLOSIVES, FIREARMS COMMERCE IN THE
UNITED STATES: ANNUAL STATISTICAL UPDATE 2012 1 (2012), available at
http://www.atf.gov/files/publications/firearms/050412-firearms-commerce-in-the-us-annual-statistical-
update-2012.pdf.
27. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1968).
28. BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS & ExPLOSIVEs, FEDERAL FIREARMS
REGULATIONS REFERENCE GUIDE 165 (2005), available at
http://www.atf.gov/files/publications/download/p/atf-p-5300-4.pdf
29. Id.
30. OONA A. HATHAWAY ET AL., ARMS TRAFFICKING: THE INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC
LEGAL FRAMEWORK 7 (2011), available at
http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/cglc/YLSreport armsTraflicking.pdf.
31. Id. at 7, 21.
32. Rep. of the U.N. Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its
Aspects, July 9-20, 2001, 7-17, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 192/15 (2001) [hereinafter U.N. Conference].
33. Id. at 10.
34. Id. at 7-17.
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Second, the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms 36 ("U.N.
Register") was drafted in 1991 in an effort to further the transparency of interstate
arms dealings.37  It serves as an interstate "confidence building" document.
Specifically, its purpose is to notify other states of excessive or destabilizing arms
accumulations. It accomplishes this goal by having states voluntarily report
annually on the import and export of conventional weapons. 38
Third, the Wassenaar Arrangement 39 was drafted in 1996 as a successor to the
Cold War era legislation, COCOM, as a transparency agreement of national export
controls. 40 Specifically, every six months, members of the Arrangement exchange
information on the exchange of conventional arms to non-members.4'
Forth, the Inter-American Convention Against Illicit Manufacturing of and
Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunitions, Explosives, and other Related Materials 42
("CIFTA") was finalized in 1997 by the Organization of American States as an
enforceable treaty on the trafficking of SALW.43 It is the first legally binding
regional agreement to specifically address the matter of arms trafficking." CIFTA
specifically mandates that signatory states must criminalize the illicit
manufacturing of SALW.45
Fifth, the Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in
Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition 46 ("Fireartms Protocol")
was drafted in 2001 as an additional binding agreement to the United Nations
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime. 47 The Protocol specifically
creates a legal obligation for ratifying states to combat the illicit manufacturing of
SALW.
Sixth, the United Nations Security Council may issue arms embargoes, or
35. Id. at 10-17.
36. G.A. Res. 46/36, U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/36 (Dec. 6, 1991).
37. Id. § L.
38. Id.
39. WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT ON EXPORT CONTROLS FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMS AND DUAL-
USE GOODS AND TECHNOLOGIES 1 (Waasennar Arrangement Secreteriat ed., 2003), available at
http://www.wassenaar.org/publicdocuments/2012/Basic%20Documents%202012.pdf.
40. Id. at 1, 3.
41. Id. at 12.
42. Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms,
Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials, Nov. 14, 1997, 2029 U.N.T.S. 55.
43. Kierstan Lee Carlson, Fighting Firearms with Fire in the OAS: A Critical Evaluation of the
Inter-American Convention Against the Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition,
and Other Related Materials, 25 AM. U. INT'L. L. REV. 611, 614-15 (2010).
44. Id. at 618.
45. Id. at 619.
46. G.A. Res. 55/255, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/255 (June 8, 2001) [hereinafter Firearms Protocol].
47. Jorene Soto, Show Me the Money, Part II: The Application of the Asset Forfeiture Provisions
of the U.S. Arms Export Control Act and the RICO Act and Suggestions for the Future, 13 OR. REV.
INT'L. L. 141, 154 (2011).
560 VOL. 41:4
THE BASIN OF DANAIDES
sanctions, 48 ("U.N. Embargoes") that are legally binding pursuant to Chapter VII
of the Charter of the United Nations. 49 U.N. Embargoes rely on member states of
the U.N. to ensure that arms are not transported to prohibited states.50 States may
be required to provide information of possible embargo violations and "name and
shame" violators.5 ' However, arms embargoes are consistently subject to criticism
as outright failures in that they do not adequately prevent the flow of arms at all.52
Together, these multilateral arms trafficking agreements are the most widely
used and often applied international governing laws regarding the illicit
manufacture and distribution of SALW. The next section of this paper will
analyze how these agreements may apply to 3-D printed weapons and possible
enforcement mechanisms of these agreements.
B. Application ofExisting International Law to 3-D Printed SALW
While arms agreements differ in application pursuant to the stage of
development of the weapon, this paper will focus its attention on the application of
arms agreements to the point of production. Marking weapons with serial numbers
and recording the number of weapons produced annually within each country is
generally the most common form of regulating the point of production of SALW.54
While not legally binding, the U.N. Programme encourages signatory states to
require reliable marking that indicates the country of origin as well as provide
information for national authorities to identify the manufacturer.5  The U.N.
Programme encourages states to prevent the illicit manufacture or transfer of
inadequately marked SALW. Also, the U.N. Programme encourages states to
publicly identify people or organizations involved in the illicit manufacture of
arms and take appropriate legal action against those in violation of the law.57
Thus, it appears that the U.N. Programme is in direct conflict with the proliferation
of illicit 3-D printing manufacturers. As a result, signatory parties would be
required to identify the people and organizations engaged in the illicit manufacture
of arms and take action against them, but there is no legal enforcement mechanism
to ensure that they do so.
CIFTA, unlike the U.N. Programme, is "hard law." There is considerable
48. See Security Council Sanctions Committees: An Overview, UNITED NATIONS,
http://www.un.org/sc/committees (last visited Apr. 2, 2013).
49. DAMIEN FRUCHART ET AL., UNITED NATIONS ARMS EMBARGOES: THEIR IMPACT ON ARMS
FLOWS AND TARGET BEHAVIOUR 1 (2007), available at
http://pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/1 12/112147_un embargoes_071126.pdf.
50. Claudette Torbey, The Most Egregious Arms Broker: Prosecuting Arms Embargo Violators in
the International Criminal Court, 25 WIS. INT'L. L.J. 335, 336 (2007).
51. Id. at 339.
52. Kopel et al., supra note 23, at 893.
53. HATHAWAY ET AL., supra note 30, at 7-9.
54. Id. at 10.
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disagreement pertaining to the best definition of "hard law" as compared to "soft
law." For the purposes of this paper, "hard law" will refer "to legally binding
obligations that are precise."58 The United States is not a party to CIFTA.59 Under
CIFTA, state parties are required to do the following: 1) criminalize the illicit
manufacturing of SALW; 2) institute domestic requirements of arms
manufacturers to mark manufactured firearms; 3) confiscate illicitly manufactured
SALW; 4) create licensing systems for the import, export, and transit of SALW; 5)
maintain records of SALW transactions for a reasonable period of time; 6)
exchange information and cooperate with other state parties; and 7) resolve
conflicts through appropriate diplomatic channels. 60  Thus, CIFTA would
specifically criminalize the illicit manufacturing of 3-D printed firearms and
signatory states would be required to take action against their proliferation.
The Firearms Protocol is also a legally enforceable treaty to which the United
States is not a party.6 1 The Firearms Protocol specifically criminalizes the illicit
manufacturing of SALW, their components, and the illicit trafficking in firearms. 62
Additionally, it requires the recording of legally manufactured weapons.63
Consequently, signatory states will again have to address and combat the illicit
manufacture of arms that will increase as a result of 3-D printing or risk being
found in subversion of a legally binding international treaty.
The Wassenaar Arrangement, the U.N. Register, and the U.N. Embargoes do
not specifically attempt to prevent the illicit manufacture of arms. Rather, they
serve to promote transparency and good faith efforts to combat the build-up of
conventional arms. Interestingly, however, previous U.N. Embargoes have called
for the prevention of dissemination of "technical training or assistance related to
the provision, manufacture, maintenance of . . . [SALW]."6 Whether the
dissemination of open source code by hosting the information on the web
constitutes a violation of a Security Council resolution will be discussed further as
a component to digital freedom of speech.
III. EXISTING UNITED STATES LAWS REGULATING THE ILLICIT MANUFACTURE
AND TRAFFICKING OF SALW
While this paper is not the place to give an exhaustive account of the complex
legal fabric of gun regulation in the United States, this section will attempt to
briefly outline relevant law within the United States crucial to understanding how
3-D printed SALW could possibly be regulated. Starting with the most relevant
and direct statute on this issue, 18 U.S.C. § 231(a)(1) states that it is a criminal act
58. Gregory C. Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, Complements, and
Antagonists in International Governance, 94 MiNN. L. REV. 706, 714 (2010).
59. Carlson, supra note 43, at 620 n.44.
60. Id. at 16.
61. Soto, supra note 47, at 154.
62. Id. at 154-55.
63. Firearms Protocol, supra note 46, at 5.
64. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1701, 15, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1701 (Aug. 11 2006).
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to "[teach] or [demonstrate] to any other person the use, application, or making of
any firearm or explosive or incendiary device . . . knowing or having reason to
know or intending that the same will be unlawfully employed for use in, or in
furtherance of, a civil disorder." 65
Extensive litigation involving this statute revolves around two primary
matters of concern: 1) the issue of "civil disorder," which is vague as to the degree
to which a defendant must foresee or reasonably foresee his contribution to the
civil disorder; and 2) the inherent conflict between 18 U.S.C. § 2, which requires a
specific mens rea of intent in contributing to a committed crime, and 18 U.S.C. §
231(a)(1), which would seemingly punish reckless or negligent teachings of
firearms even where no crime has been committed.66
Next, 18 U.S.C. § 842(p) also addresses the issue of "recipe dissemination" of
illicit arms by criminalizing the teaching or demonstration of the making of or use
of an explosive, destructive device, or a weapon of mass destruction.67 Destructive
devices include bombs, grenades, or mines.t6 Like 18 U.S.C. § 231, 18 U.S.C. §
842 has an intent requirement that is often difficult to prove.69
More generally, the United States Gun Control Act of 1968 ("GCA") 70 and
the National Firearms Act of 1934 ("NFA")7 1 (collectively the "Acts") are the
principal acts that govern the more generalized aspects of gun control.72 The Acts
are premised on the nearly outmoded model of centralized production and
distribution of guns.73  The Acts use several mutual devices to regulate the
production of arms such as licensing and marking requirements, registration, and
record keeping laws.
The GCA governs a wide spectrum of weapons including "destructive
devices," which it defines generally as "firearms." 74  It specifically defines
"manufacturer" "as any person engaged in the business of manufacturing firearms
or ammunition for purposes of sale or distribution."75 Moreover, the GCA requires
that anyone engaged in the commercial manufacturing, dealing in, or importing of
65. 18 U.S.C.A. § 231(a)(1) (West 1994).
66. Leslie Kendrick, Note, A Test for Criminally Instructional Speech, 91 VA. L. REV. 1973, 2006
(2005).
67. 18 U.S.C.A. § 842 (West 2003).
68. 18 U.S.C.A. § 921 (West 2006).
69. LiezI Irene Pangilinan, "When a Nation is at War": A Context-Dependent Theory of Free
Speech for the Regulation of Weapon Recipes, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 683, 715 (2004).
70. Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-31
(2006)).
71. National Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5872 (2006).
72. Franklin E. Zimring, Firearms and Federal Law: The Gun Control Act of 1968, 4 J. LEGAL
STUD. 133, 175 (1975).
73. KEVIN J. O'NEILL, Is TECHNOLOGY OUTMODING TRADITIONAL FIREARMS REGULATION? 3-D
PRINTING, STATE SECURITY, AND THE NEED FOR REGULATORY FORESIGHT IN GUN POLICY 5-6 (2012),
available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2186936.
74. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3) (2006).
75. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(10).
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"firearms" be licensed.76 The GCA also bans the interstate sale of firearms to non-
licensed individuals.7 7
For purposes of allowing the government to trace weapons, the GCA also
requires the marking of firearms with a serial number on the receiver or frame of
the weapon. It is unlawful to be in possession of a weapon that does not have a
serial number permitting tracing of the weapon. 79  By forcing manufacturers,
distributors, and retailers to keep records of firearms sales, local law enforcement
as well as the ATF can trace weapons used in crimes by providing a first lead for
covert operations.so
The NFA's original purpose was to regulate dangerous "gangster weapons"
such as machine guns, silencers, and short barreled shotguns.8 ' Today, the NFA
regulates these weapons in a variety of ways. The most comprehensive means for
regulation is the creation of a national registration database by which the firearm is
identified, the date of registration is recorded, and the identification and the home
address of the person entitled to the firearm are recorded.82 Ancillary to the
creation of this database of registration is the NFA's requirement that mandates the
owner of the weapon to report to the government regarding any manufacture or
transfer of a weapon that fits within the definitions set forth by the NFA. 83 It is
incumbent upon the owner of the weapon to retain proof of registration.84 The
NFA criminalizes the illicit possession, transfer, or manufacture of listed weapons
in infringement of the NFA."
Lastly, it is worth noting that in addition to the Acts, the Undetectable
Firearms Act ("UFA") of 1988 requires that gun components: 1) generate accurate
depictions in x-ray machines; and 2) activate metal detectors. 86 That being said, it
is only necessary to reference the UFA due to the frequency with which it is
referenced in topical literature. At the moment, there are no plastic polymers
strong enough to be used in combination with a 3-D printer to make a universally
plastic or undetectable weapon that can withstand the heat and pressures inherent
with the use of a firearm.
In summary, it is clear that there already exists a comprehensive domestic and
international legal structure apposite to the illicit manufacture of arms. However,
76. 18 U.S.C. § 923(a).
77. 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(2).
78. 18 U.S.C. § 923(i).
79. 18 U.S.C. § 922(k).
80. O'NEILL, supra note 73, at 6-7.
81. 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a) (2013).
82. See 26 U.S.C. § 5841(a).
83. 27 C.F.R. §§ 479.62 (2013).
84. 26 U.S.C. § 5841(e).
85. See 26 U.S.C. § 5861(b)-(f).
86. 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(p).
87. Rich Brown, You Don't Bring a 3D Printer to a Gun Fight-Yet, CNET (Sept. 6, 2012, 4:00
AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-11386_3-57499326-76/you-dont-bring-a-3d-printer-to-a-gun-fight-yet.
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whether or not these laws will be substantially disrupted by the development of 3-
D printing technology depends on how governments can effectively regulate this
technology. Inherent in the regulation of 3-D printing lies the question of where
are the boundaries of digital free speech as recognized by international law. The
question of digital freedom of speech is inherent to the discussion of 3-D printed
weapons because one of the most effective means of controlling the distribution of
3-D printed weapons would be by controlling the distribution of its source code.
Source code, however, may constitute protected speech and governments would
therefore not be able to regulate the distribution of the code. The next section of
this paper will analyze how governments may best address the matter of 3-D
printing while still respecting the inherent right of freedom of speech.
IV. Is SOURCE CODE SPEECH?
Source code is the highly structured human readable text used to write
computer programs. There are numerous programming platforms on which
programmers may write code, such as Java or HTML. One of the most effective
means for combatting the proliferation of 3-D manufactured SALW would be to
prevent the proliferation of its source code by criminalizing its possession and
distribution by unlicensed manufacturers: effectively declaring source code not
protected by existing legal structures regarding freedom of speech. If source code
is deemed to not satisfy the standard of what may be defined as speech, it could be
treated in much the same way as the digital possession or distribution of child
pornography. Therefore, a coherent analysis must be undertaken to reasonably
understand how digital source code for a SALW may or may not be protected by
international law.
Historically, both domestic and international charters have consistently
reaffirmed the right of a people to freedom of speech. In the United States, the
First Amendment commands, "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech."88 Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights
provides that "[e]veryone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall
include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas
without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers." 89  Even
Article 19 of the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights reaffirms
that "[e]veryone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right
includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and
impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers."90
After analyzing these documents it is clear that there exists a general international
legal presumption for the protection of free speech. The question then becomes:
88. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
89. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 10, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S 221.
90. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (I) A, U.N. Doc. A/Res/217(lll)
(Dec. 10, 1948).
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how is "speech" best defined as germane to whether source code is encapsulated
and thus protected by these documents.
Fortunately, relevant United States Supreme Court jurisprudence exists that
defines "speech." Specifically, the Court ruled that "symbolic" conduct, in which
"'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct,"
must be evaluated according to a balancing test.91 This duality is relevant because
of the inherent similarities to source code's own duality between "expression" and
"function." For "symbolic" conduct to weigh in favor of protected "speech," it
must be "sufficiently imbued with elements of communication" to merit
constitutional protection. 92 In plainer terms, if the source code simply instructs a
machine to produce an outcome, then it is likely not sufficiently "expressive" so as
to satisfy the standard for protection under the First Amendment. 93 However, if the
source code ends up having some direct interaction with the programmer, in that it
discretely conveys a programming concept, then it may satisfy the standard
required for protection as freedom of speech. Applying this standard of review,
however, produces a variety of legal conclusions as to how source code should
actually be classified.
In the earliest case regarding this issue, Bernstein v. United States Department
of Justice, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the government's argument
that source code is uniquely functional and therefore protected by the First
Amendment.94 Additionally, in Junger v. Daley, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals overruled the lower court's decision and held that "[b]ecause computer
source code is expressive means for exchange of information and ideas about
computer programming, it is protected by the First Amendment." 95 Alternatively,
in Karn v. United States Department of State, the District of Colombia District
Court did not specifically address whether source code is protected under the First
Amendment, but simply noted it is "merely a means of commanding a computer to
perform a function."96 In all three cases, the plaintiffs argued that the source code
was protected free speech, and in all three cases the courts proffered different
conclusions. Therefore, it is clear that the American jurisprudence on this matter is
not settled.
Internationally, case law determining whether source code is protected free
speech has similarly emerged. In 1999, a 15-year-old Norwegian boy, Jon
Johansen, reverse engineered a licensed DVD player and released a software
91. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
92. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974).
93. Recent Case, Constitutional Law-Free Speech Clause-Sixth Circuit Classifies Computer
Source Code as Protected Speech.-Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481 (6th Cir. 2000), 114 HARV. L. REV.
1813, 1817 (2001).
94. Bernstein v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 176 F.3d 1132, 1141-42 (9th Cir. 1999) reh'g granted,
opinion withdrawn, 192 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 1999).
95. Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481, 485 (6th Cir. 2000).
96. Kam v. U.S. Dep't of State, 925 F. Supp. 1, 9 n.19 (D.D.C. 1996).
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program titled "DeCSS."97 DeCSS unlocked the Digital Rights Management
("DRM") on DVDs, thus allowing Linux computers previously incapable of
playing DVDs (because they did not have either Apple or Microsoft Windows
operating systems) to now play these DVDs.9 8 When the motion picture industry
became aware of the presence of DeCSS online, it sent cease and desist letters to
the website operators publishing the software. 99  Eventually, the Norwegian
Economic and Environmental Crime Unit ("0KOKRIM") brought suit against Jon
Johansen at the behest of the Motion Picture Association of America
("MPAA").'00 Ultimately, the Norwegian court dropped the suit, but it is a
worthwhile case to note because of the precedent it set indicating that mere
publication of undesirable open source code could merit criminal procedure.
Moreover, while the MPAA and the Norwegian Crime Unit both brought suit
against a handful of parties, the criminal proceedings did little or nothing to
prevent future enlargement of the software's publication, and it continued to spread
like "wildfire."' 0'
Determining whether source code represents protected speech requires a
complex analysis. Currently it is impossible to determine with certainty how
future domestic and international courts will rule on this matter. It is likely,
however, that the paradigm of governments arguing that source code is not
protected speech versus private citizens continuing to expand the boundaries of
what is protected in the digital realm will continue. In the words of Professor Jean
L. Camp at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, there is a strong public
policy argument that "[s]ource code is speech which empowers the individual
against possible errors or abuses of governance at the state and Federal level."1 02
In any event, even if future courts do determine that source code is protected
speech, further analysis must be made as to how the publication of SALW
schematic source code is likely to be regulated.
V. COULD SALW SOURCE CODE BE CLASSIFIED AS CRIME-INDUCING SPEECH?
The doctrine of "aiding and abetting" has long since been classified and
criminalized both in the United States and in Europe as criminally instructional
speech and thus protected by neither the First Amendment nor Article 10 of the
European Convention of Human Rights.'0 3 In the United States, 18 U.S.C. § 2
97. Amy E. McCall, The DMCA and Researchers'First Amendment Rights, 3 U. PITT. J. TECH. L.
& POL'Y 1, 6 (2002).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 7.
100. Gabriella Coleman, Code Is Speech: Legal Tinkering, Expertise, and Protest Among Free and
Open Source Software Developers, 24 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 420, 436 (2009), available at
http://steinhardt.nyu.edulscmsAdmin/uploads/005/984/Coleman-Code-is-Speech.pdf
101. Id.
102. Jean Camp & K. Lewis, Code as Speech: A Discussion of Bernstein v. USDOJ, Kam v.
USDOS, and Junger v. Daley in Light of the U.S. Supreme Court's Shift to Federalism, 3 ETHICS &
INFO. TECH. 21, 27 (2001).
103. Kendrick, supra note 66, at 1974.
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establishes that "[w]hoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly
performed by him or another would be an offense against the United States, is
punishable as a principal."'0
The generally understood basis for such criminalization is centered upon the
principle that such speech should more accurately be considered action rather than
speech. 0 5 Justice Hugo Black eloquently expressed this distinction in Giboney v.
Emprire Storage & Ice Co., stating: "[i]t rarely has been suggested that the
constitutional freedom for speech and press extends its immunity to speech or
writing used as an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute.
We reject the contention now."106 Nevertheless, there are a variety of cases
instructive in how to best classify and understand the likely category of 3-D
printing, though the potential conclusions vary greatly between domestic and
international courts. The following cases should be considered an overview of
how courts have dealt with this matter in the past. This section is divided into a
section on international case law pertaining to criminalized speech and a section on
United States law pertaining to criminalized speech.
A. International Case Law Pertaining to Criminalized Speech
First, in the case decided by the European Court of Human Rights, Jerslid v.
Denmark, the Court adjudicated the matter of a journalist who disseminated the
racist remarks of a xenophobic group of young people who went by the name the
"greenjackets."l 07 The Court ruled that national authorities were permitted to
interfere with the enjoyment of an individual's right of freedom of expression only
when it is "necessary in a democratic society."' 08 The Court established that it
would look at the interference complained of in light of the case as a whole and
determine whether the reasons argued by the national authorities to justify the
censorship were relevant and sufficient and whether the means employed were
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.' 09
In this case, the Court determined that the mere publication of racist remarks,
not for the purposes of promoting racism, was protected speech in that it did not
sufficiently interfere with a democratic society.' "o Thus, the Court established a
balancing test in determining whether certain speech is protected or not under
Article 10. If the speech outweighs the interest of the state in promoting freedom
of speech by its harm to a democratic society, then it appears the European Court is
willing to censor that speech and punish the individual responsible.
The European Court of Human Rights further elaborated upon the meaning of
104. 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2000).
105. See Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949).
106. Id.
107. Jersild v. Denmark, 298 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 10 (1995).
108. Id. at 20.
109. Id. at 23-24.
110. Id. at 24-26.
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"necessary in democratic society" in the case of Vejdeland and others v.
Sweden."' In this case the Court explained that the standard for evaluation
requires the Court to determine whether there exists a "pressing social need" for
the restriction of free speech.1 2 Moreover, while the states have a "margin of
appreciation" in determining whether such a need exists, there definitively exists
"European supervision" to give a final ruling of whether a restriction of speech is
permissible." 3  When "European supervision" is invoked, the Court evaluates
whether the interference at issue was "'proportionate' to the legitimate [social] aim
pursued and whether the reasons adduced by them to justify the interference are
'relevant and sufficient.""'14 The Court iterated that the freedom of expression or
ideas is applicable not only to ideas that are favorably received by the public, but
those expressions or ideas that "offend, shock, or disturb."" 5
Lastly, in determining whether an individual's claim of a violation of Article
10 constitutes an unnecessary restriction, the person must have exercised his right
in a manner consistent with democratic principles.' 6 The person must act in good
faith as to the legitimacy of his statements and have voiced them in a way that was
compatible with democratic aims and be supported by the facts of the case." 7
B. American Cases Pertaining to Criminalized Speech
In the landmark United States Supreme Court case, Brandenburg v. Ohio, the
Court established the important disambiguation of "mere advocacy" from
"incitement to imminent lawless action."' 8 In this case, the Court ruled that the
Ohio Criminal Syndicalism Act by its own words purported to criminalize mere
advocacy and therefore was unconstitutional." 9 This case is important in any
analysis of crime-inducing speech in that it establishes the "Brandenburg Test" to
examine whether law protects the speech. The Brandenburg test turns on three
essential elements of analysis: intent, imminence, and likelihood.' 20 In effect, the
Brandenburg Test establishes the following principle:
[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not
permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of
law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce




114. Id. 1| 52.
115. Id. 1153.
116. Thorgeir Thorgeirson v. Iceland, 239 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 26 (1992).
117. Id.
118. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448-49 (1969).
119. Id. at 449.
120. Id. at 447.
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such action.121
Rice v. Paladin Enterprises is also a particularly instructive case in the
analysis of whether the source code of SALW may constitute protected speech
under the First Amendment.122 In this case, the plaintiff brought suit against a
publishing company in a wrongful death action for two books, one titled Hit Man:
A Technical Manual for Independent Contractors and the other titled How To
Make a Disposable Silencer, Vol. II.123 Using these books as instruction manuals,
an individual named James Perry murdered three people under a contract by
following the instructions of the book in great detail.124 The plaintiffs thus alleged
that by publishing the instruction manuals on how to murder, the defendant had
"aided and abetted" in the murders.125 In its analysis, the District Court identified
five categories of constitutionally unprotected speech: obscenity, fighting words,
libel, commercial speech, and incitement to imminent lawless activity under the
Brandenburg Test.126  The District Court disregarded the first four potential
categories of unprotected speech as irrelevant to the case and analyzed whether the
book satisfied the Brandenburg Test.
The District Court found that a book published in 1983 and purchased and
read in 1992 could not satisfy the "imminence test" as established by Brandenburg
for a murder that occurred in 1993.127 As a result, the District Court granted
summary judgment. 128 However, on appeal, Judge Michael Luttig of the Fourth
Circuit refused to conduct his analysis as established by the previous jurisprudence
under the Brandenburg Test and instead chose to evaluate whether the book was
protected under the First Amendment by means of the traditional "speech-act
paradigm" used to criminalize aiding and abetting.129  In his conclusion, he
explained that the book "constitute[d] the archetypal example of [unprotected]
speech . . . because it methodically and comprehensively prepare[d] and st[ole] its
audience to specific criminal conduct . . . [thus the speech] finds no preserve in the
First Amendment."' 30
Lastly, in United States v. Featherston, the Fifth Circuit upheld an appeal
challenging the conviction of the defendants for teaching the making of explosives
in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 231(a)(1). '' This statute criminalizes the actions of
"[w]hoever teaches or demonstrates to any other person the use, application, or
121. Id.
122. Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 940 F. Supp. 836, 840-41 (D. Md. 1996), rev'd, 128 F.3d 233
(4th Cir. 1997).
123. Id. at 838.
124. Id. at 839.
125. Id. at 838.
126. Id. at 841.
127. Id. at 847.
128. Id. at 849.
129. Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 263 (4th Cir. 1997); Kendrick, supra note 66, at
2001.
130. Rice, 128 F.3d at 256.
131. U.S. v. Featherston, 461 F.2d 1119, 1121-22 (5th Cir. 1972).
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making of any firearm or explosive . . . knowing or having reason to know or
intending that the same will be unlawfully employed for use in, or in furtherance
of, a civil disorder."l 32 The appellants argued that the statute was excessively
broad with its language, "knowing or having reason to know," and thus
unconstitutional.' 33  The Court ruled that the statute does not cover mere
inadvertent conduct; rather, the statute requires that the accused party have acted
with the necessary intent or knowledge that the information would be used in
furtherance of civil disorder.' 34  Consequently, the statute on its face is not
unconstitutional.' 35 The Court simply established that the jury must be instructed
that in order to convict the defendant, they must find that at the time and place in
question, the defendants knew and intended the incendiary devices to be
unlawfully employed for use in, or in furtherance of, a civil disorder. 36
VI. CONCLUSIONS
It appears that the technology of 3-D printing is likely to lead the twenty-first
century into another highly transformative century in which the role of
governments, the right of the people to bear arms, and the boundaries of free
speech will all be called deeply into further question. How exactly this will all turn
out is impossible to say, nevertheless, certain conclusions do seem particularly
likely.
First, SALW are bound to become more accessible and widespread in
countries where strict gun control is in place. For example, in countries like
Mexico, which has a population of 105 million and only 4,300 people who carry
licenses to possess a weapon, it is likely 3-D printed weapons will become more
accessible to the common citizen not involved with the cartels or army, but, who
nevertheless desire to have a weapon.' 37 Ancillary to the direct manufacture of
arms in a person's home, it is also probable that this will place negative pressure
on the illicit trafficking of SALW from the United States, the place of origin of
eighty-seven percent of the firearms seized by Mexican officials, to Mexico.' 38 It
appears unlikely that the technology of 3-D printing weapons will have much a of
a destabilizing domestic effect within the United States due to the existing mature
market for firearms and the ease with which those who would otherwise be
prohibited from obtaining a firearm may acquire one cheaply and illicitly via
132. 18 U.S.C.A. § 231(a)(1) (West 1994).
133. Featherston, 461 F.2d at 1121.
134. Id. at 1122.
135. Id. at 1121.
136. Id. at 1122.
137. David B. Kopel, Mexico 's Federal Law ofFirearms and Explosives 6 (Univ. of Denver
Sturm Coll. of Law Legal Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 10-12, 2010), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstract-id-I 588296.
138. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FIREARMS TRAFFICKING: U.S. EFFORTS TO COMBAT
ARMS TRAFFICKING TO MEXICO FACE PLANNING AND COORDINATION CHALLENGES 3 (2009),
available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/300/291223.pdf.
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"straw purchases."
Second, because the prospects of directly manufacturing a weapon in a
person's home is likely to destabilize and decentralize the established channels of
production, it is unclear how those who currently benefit from the status quo of
gun manufacturing, the established gun industry, will react. To date there have
been no official statements made by the National Rifle Association ("NRA")
regarding 3-D printing weapons. However, it is not difficult to foresee a strong
conflict of interest between the fiduciary obligation of the gun manufacturing
industry to share-holders and the promotion of the NRA's own mission statement
to "foster the Second Amendment rights of all law-abiding Americans."' 39
Because of the strong financial ties between the NRA and the gun industry, and
because of the strong financial stress that could result from the widespread
distribution of 3-D printed weapons, one can reasonably conclude that the existing
gun lobbying organizations will not come to the legislative aid of those working to
expand the technology of 3-D printed weapons.
Third, there will be continued and extensive litigation in the matter of whether
source code is constitutionally protected free speech under the First Amendment
and Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights until the highest
courts establish a coherent rule on the matter. If source code is protected speech,
then there is seemingly not much that governments could do to combat the illicit
manufacture of SALW other than punish manufacturers, owners, and distributors
of SALW. Regulation would thus be forced to combat the manufacture of these
weapons in much the same way as regulation is pursued by governments with the
manufacturers, owners, and distributors of child pornography and illicit drugs.
Unfortunately for those who desire increased gun control, it is likely such efforts
would similarly fail.
Fourth, in the event that source code is determined by international courts not
to constitute protected speech, then the question is raised whether the example
discussed in this paper of DeCSS's "wildfire-like" dissemination would be
prophetic of future attempts to prohibit the distribution of software. While it is
impossible to answer definitively, it is certainly reasonable to presume that
prophylactic attempts to regulate the distribution of source code will also be
equally ineffective in reducing the illicit manufacture of SALW.
Together, these conclusions suggest that irrespective of future government
regulation, the development of 3-D printing is going to have considerable
consequences in redefining how individuals worldwide are able to obtain weapons,
how governments will be able to remain relevant in regulating of the actions of
their citizens, and how reactionary governmental controls will further come in
conflict with technological development. Harmonization of international firearms
law with the evolving technology of 3-D printing manufacturing is necessary to
provide continued effective gun control measures in the twenty-first century.
139. Mission Statement, NAT'L RIFLE ASS'N FOUND., http://www.nrafoundation.org/mission-
statement.aspx (last visited July 15, 2013).
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However, there is likely no single law or regulatory mechanism that can be
introduced to solve the issue. Any genuine attempts to effectively regulate this
technology are likely to be particularly complex and difficult. Therefore, work in
developing and researching appropriate responses should begin immediately if
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